Abstract. Consider a polynomial-time prover holding a set of secrets.
Introduction
Consider a polynomial-time prover that has committed to a vector of secrets and wants to demonstrate that the secrets satisfy some satis able formula from propositional logic, where the atomic propositions are relations that are linear in the secrets. An example formula is ? (5x 1 ? 3x 2 = 5) AND (2x 2 + 3x 3 = 7) OR ? NOT(x 1 + 4x 3 = 5) ;
where (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) is the prover's vector of secrets. The prover does not want to reveal any more information about its secrets than what is conveyed by the formula itself. Can a truly practical protocol for this task be constructed?
In this paper we will show that truly practical protocols exist, assuming the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm problem or the RSA/factoring problem. Our protocols can be performed in all manner of proof modes, including four-move zero-knowledge proofs, three-move witness-hiding proofs, interactive or non-interactive signed proofs that are provably secure in the random oracle model, limited-show proofs, multi-prover proofs, and blinded and restrictively blinded signed proofs.
Our results are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses preliminary notions and reviews basic results. Related work is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce our techniques for rapidly demonstrating linear relations connected by boolean operators. We conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, the polynomial-time prover and the (not necessarily polynomial-time) veri er are denoted by P and V, respectively. The symbol \ " is used to denote assignment, and j j denotes binary length. The symbol \2 R " and the word \random" indicate an independent and uniformly random choice, and we allow distributions that are computationally indistinguishable for polynomially bounded V and statistically indistinguishable for unbounded V. Whenever we say that P is able to prove knowledge, we imply the existence of a knowledge extractor that outputs a witness when having oracle access to P.
Our techniques can be based either on the Discrete Logarithm assumption or on the RSA/factoring assumption. We now discuss preliminary notions and basic cryptographic results for these two settings.
Discrete Logarithm Setting
Set-up. P and V initially agree on a cyclic group of order q, denoted by G q , where q is an integer. E cient algorithms must be available for recognizing, testing equivalence of, and multiplying numbers in G q . Without loss of generality it is assumed that q uniquely identi es G q . Additionally, k 1 generators, g 1 ; : : : ; g k , of G q , are agreed on; we call (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ) a generator-tuple. From now on, an integer in the Discrete Log setting is said to be \small" if it is polynomial in jqj, and \large" otherwise.
Using the terminology of 6, 7] , a representation of a number h 2 G q with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ) is a vector of numbers, (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ), such that
where x 1 ; : : : ; x k are in Z q . Intractability of Collision-Finding. For the security of V it is important that P cannot know more than one representation of the same number, since it serves as a commit on P's secrets. For the purpose of the following proposition, which has been proved by Chaum, van Heijst and P tzmann 14] for constant k, and by 6, page 16] more generally 1 for all small k, we assume that q is generated according to a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (the \DL-instance generator") that, on input a security parameter, outputs a triple (q; g; h), where g and h are generators of G q . Proposition 1. Consider the case that q, as output by the DL-instance generator, is always a prime, and k is small. Assuming that the Discrete Logarithm problem is intractable over the DL-instance generator, there cannot exist a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input q (having a distribution that is indistinguishably close to that of q induced by the DL-instance generator) and a randomly chosen generator-tuple (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ), outputs with non-negligible probability of success a number h 2 G q and two di erent representations of h. 1 Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser 2] noted that the reduction can be modi ed to achieve a success probability for the Discrete-Logarithm nder that is within a constant factor of that of the collision-nding oracle, instead of being inversely proportionate to k. Speci cally, their modi cation achieves a constant factor 1=2, instead of 2=k. Note, however, that the optimization mentioned in 6, page 17] already achieves this (the constant factor is 1=2 + 1=(2k)). To guarantee V's security one should generate the elements of the set-up in accordance with the probability distributions of the appropriate DL-instance generator, depending on which form of q's one is interested in. The set-up should be generated by V itself, in a mutually random fashion between V and P, by a party trusted by V or liable for security breaks by P, or in any other manner that ensures that P cannot nd collisions for the generated instance. Proving Knowledge. Our results in Section 4 can be based on any proof of knowledge (see Bellare and Goldreich 1]) of a representation. For practical purposes we are interested in highly e cient protocols that o er a wide range of proof modes. The following generic protocol enables P, for any m with 1 m k, to demonstrate knowledge of a representation, (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) (its secret key), of a number h 2 G q (its public key) with respect to a generator-tuple, (g 1 ; : : : ; g m ).
We assume for the moment that q is a prime.
Step 1. P generates at random m numbers w 1 ; : : : ; w m 2 R Z q , and sends a Q m i=1 g wi i to V.
Step 2. P computes m responses, responsive to a challenge c 2 Z 2 t, according to r i cx i + w i mod q, for i = 1; : : : ; m, and sends them to V. The process of generating c and the size of t determine the proof mode of the protocol;
in the appendix several proof modes of particular relevance are discussed.
Step 3. V accepts if and only if h ?c Q m i=1 g ri i = a. One can also consider the above protocol for q's that are not prime, and in particular for all the forms discussed in the preceding subsubsection. Of course, this has rami cations with respect to the proof modes and/or the intractability assumptions needed for security. 2.2 RSA Setting Set-up. P and V initially agree on a group Z n , where n = pq and p and q are distinct primes. They also agree on an integer, v. Additionally, k 1 numbers, g 1 ; : : : ; g k , all in Z n , are agreed on. From now on, an integer in the RSA setting is said to be \small" if it is polynomial in jnj, and \large" otherwise.
A representation of a number h in Z n , with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ; v), is a vector of numbers, (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ; x k+1 ), such that
where x k+1 is in Z n and x 1 ; : : : ; x k are in Z v . Intractability of Collision-Finding. For the security of V it is important that at least P cannot know more than one representation of the same number.
For the purpose of the following two propositions, we assume that n is generated according to a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (the \RSA-instance generator") that, on input a security parameter and an integer v, outputs a pair (n; y 2 Z n ). For any integer v 2, we can consider the problem of extracting v-th roots modulo n; this is called the RSA problem for that particular v.
Proposition 2. Suppose that v is a prime that is co-prime to '(n), and that k is small. Assuming that the RSA problem for v is intractable over the RSAinstance generator, there cannot exist a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input n (having a distribution that is indistinguishably close to that of n induced by the RSA-instance generator) and randomly chosen (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ), outputs with non-negligible probability of success a number h 2 Z n and two di erent representations of h with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ; v).
Sketch of proof. To compute y 1=v mod n, on input y 2 Z n , construct each g i as y ri s v i mod n, for r i 2 R Z v and s i 2 R Z n . If the oracle output is correct, a relation of the form y t = u v mod n can be computed, for known t 2 Z v and u 2 Z n , and from this y 1=v mod n can be computed. Note that if p and q are random primes of equal size, then a random element in Z n has small order with negligible probability; see H astad, Schrift and
Other choices of v are possible as well. For example, in case v is small and not co-prime to '(n), according to Ohta and Okamoto 25, Theorem 1] it is as hard to compute v-th roots as to factor the modulus. By restricting the g i 's and x k+1 in the de nition of a representation to v-th residues, one can prove the di culty of nding collisions for v's of this particular form in a likewise manner. The following result shows that this also holds for large v of a special form. Proposition 3. Consider the case in which v = 2 l , for any integer l, and the RSA-instance generator always outputs Blum integers (i.e., p and q are congruent to 3 mod 4). Furthermore, restrict the number x k+1 in a representation to be a quadratic residue. Assuming that the factoring problem is intractable over the RSA-instance generator, there cannot exist a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input n (having a distribution that is indistinguishably close to that of n induced by the RSA-instance generator) and randomly chosen quadratic residues (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ), outputs with non-negligible probability of success a number h 2 Z n and two di erent representations of h with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ; v).
Proving Knowledge. Our results in Section 4 can be based on any proof of knowledge of a representation. The following generic protocol is very e cient and o ers a wide range of proof modes. For any m with 0 m k, the protocol enables P to demonstrate knowledge of a representation, (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; x m+1 ), of a number h 2 Z n with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g m ; v). For the moment, we assume that v is a prime that is co-prime to '(n).
Step 1. P generates at random m numbers w 1 ; : : : ; w m 2 R Z v , and a number w m+1 2 R Z n . P computes a g w1 1 g wm m w v m+1 mod n, and sends a to V.
Step 2. P computes m+1 responses, responsive to a challenge c 2 Z 2 t , according to r i cx i + w i mod v, for 1 i m, and
x c m+1 w m+1 mod n;
and sends them to V.
Step 3. By making minor adjustments to the above protocol, we can use v's that are not prime and/or not co-prime to '(n). In all these cases, one has to restrict the set from which the g i 's and x m+1 and w m+1 are chosen, to avoid leakage of information about P's representation; similar adjustments as discussed in the preceding subsubsection can be made. Note, however, that if v is a large composite with a small prime factor, u, and it is feasible to randomly generate u-th residues without knowing a u-th root, then P can convince V in the threemove protocol with non-negligible success probability (speci cally, 1=u if v=u has no small prime factors, and larger otherwise) without knowing a representation of h with respect to (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ; v); for these v's, another protocol should be used.
Related Work
A constant-round zero-knowledge argument for our task can be constructed by properly reducing the boolean formula that is to be demonstrated to an instance of the NP-complete language Directed Hamiltonian Cycle, and applying the zeroknowledge argument of knowledge of Feige and Shamir 18] . However, techniques such as this are not practical, because they amount to encoding the statement into a boolean circuit and using commitments for each gate.
By restricting q in the Discrete Logarithm setting to be a prime, one can de ne a relation, R = R q;(g1;:::;g k );( 1;:::; k ) , for any q, for any generator-tuple (g 1 ; : : : ; g k ) and any vector of coe cients ( 1 ; : : : ; k ) 2 (Z q ) k nf0g k , as follows:
The corresponding language is easily seen to be random self-reducible. In the RSA setting, for v a prime that is co-prime to '(n), a random self-reducible language can be de ned in a similar manner. Now, by applying the construction of If a monotone formula has m logical connectives, then this technique requires the prover to perform m proofs of knowledge, one for each sub-formula. In contrast, our \AND" technique has the property that the communication complexity for both the prover and the veri er slightly decreases as the number of \AND" connectives increases, and the computational complexity is virtually una ected. Another important di erence is in the scenario that is considered. Namely, De Santis et al. and Cramer et al. consider a situation in which there are many di erent public keys, and P demonstrates (in zero-knowledge) that it knows the secret keys corresponding to some of these. In contrast, we are concerned with the situation in which the prover knows a single public key, and demonstrates that its secret key satis es a certain formula.
Demonstrating Boolean Formulae for Linear Relations
In this section we describe our proof techniques for \AND," \NOT" and \OR" connectives, respectively, and then show how to combine them in order to demonstrate arbitrary boolean formulae. Without loss of generality we base our discussions on the Discrete Logarithm setting, and for the RSA setting describe only the necessary adaptations. Note that if k = 1, then V can verify for any boolean formula directly whether the secret of P satis es it, and so from now on we only consider the case k 2.
4.1 Formulae with only \AND" connectives We rst consider the situation in which P has to demonstrate a satis able formula with zero or more \AND" connectives. At the outset, P has committed to a set of secrets, (x 1 ; : : : ; x (1) x (2) . . .
The coe cients ij , for 1 i l and 1 j k ? l, are elements of Z q , and if and only if it knows a set of secrets that satis es the formula (2). The proof follows straightforwardly, by considering the relations that are satis ed by the output of the knowledge extractor. Note that the tuple in Proposition 4 is a generator-tuple with overwhelming probability in case q is a prime and the prover selects the matrix entries, ij , and can always be guaranteed to be so when the matrix entries are determined by V.
We can e ciently implement the protocol by using the proof of knowledge for Discrete Logarithm representations described in Section 2. An important bene t of using this protocol is that one can expand the resulting expressions, so that
Step 
The particular proof mode of the protocol is \inherited" from the mode in which the underlying proof of knowledge is performed, and a further discussion is therefore omitted here. Note, however, that special care must be taken for signed proofs: the transcript of a protocol execution is always convincing of the fact that P knows a set of secrets corresponding to h, but convinces of its conformity with the demonstrated formula only when a uniquely identifying description of the demonstrated formula is hashed along (or when the ij 's and the b i 's are all restricted to sets that are negligible in the range of the hash function).
To base the proof on the RSA/factoring problem, consider P having to prove the system of linear relations (1), but with \mod v" replacing \mod q." We assume that P has committed to a set of secrets, (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ), by sending h g x1 if and only if it knows a set of secrets that satis es the formula. By using the e cient proof of knowledge for the RSA setting described in Section 2, again expanding the resulting expressions, a single precomputed table can be used for simultaneous repeated squaring; of course, one then also inherits the limitations in the range of choices for v.
Formulae with only \NOT" connectives
We next study the situation in which P has to demonstrate that a linear relation does not hold, without revealing more information than required. The situation at the outset is as in Subsection 4.1. This time, P has to demonstrate to V that its representation satis es the formula NOT ? x (1) = 1 + 2 x (2) + + k x (k) mod q :
The coe cients i , for 1 i k, are elements of Z q . Clearly, the permutation ( ) can always be de ned to interchange at most two elements and leave the rest unchanged.
Our technique for demonstrating formula (3) is based on the following result.
Proposition 6. Let q be a prime. P can prove knowledge of a representation of g (1) with respect to
g (2) ; : : : ; g k (1) g (k) if and only if it knows a set of secrets that satis es the formula (3). If q is not a prime, then the inverse of the di erence number, , is not guaranteed to exist. If q is a composite that is hard to factor then zero-divisors cannot be found and so nothing is lost, and in other cases we can force the existence of an inverse by making additional assumptions about the coe cients in (3) and/or about the representation of P.
Applying the e cient proof of knowledge for the Discrete Logarithm setting described in Section 2, the following practical protocol results:
Step 1. P generates at random k numbers, w 1 ; : : : ; w k 2 R Z q , and computes a h ?w1 g P k i=1 iwi (1) k Y i=2 g wi (i) : P then sends a to V.
Step 2. Let denote ( 1 + P k i=2 i x (i) ) ?x (1) 
As before, this protocol inherits the proof modes of the protocol described in Section 2. Note that signed proofs convince only of the demonstrated formula if the i 's are hashed along or if they are restricted to be in small sets.
Our technique can also be based on the RSA/factoring problem. Consider P having to prove formula (3), with \mod v" replacing \mod q," and having committed to (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) using h g x1 1 g x k k x v k+1 mod n, for x k+1 in Z n . Proposition 8. If v is a prime (or a composite that is hard to factor), then P can prove knowledge of a representation of g (1) with respect to g 1 (1) h ?1 mod n; g 2 (1) g (2) mod n; : : : ; g k (1) g (k) mod n; v); if and only if it knows a set of secrets that satis es the formula.
Of course, if v = 2 then all boolean formula are monotone and one can do without this technique.
Formulae with only \OR" connectives
We now show how P can demonstrate that at least one of two linear relations holds, without revealing which one; this technique is an application of the \OR" technique of De Santis et al. and Cramer et al., although the scenario is di erent.
The situation at the outset is again as in Subsection 4.1. This time P has to demonstrate to V that the representation known to it satis es the formula
The coe cients i and i , for 1 i k, are elements of Z q , and ( ) and ( ) are permutations of f1; : : : ; kg that can always be de ned to interchange at most two elements each.
If (and only if) the rst linear relation holds, then P can compute, for any challenge c 1 , responses (r 2 ; : : : ; r k ) such that a 1 = h ?c1 g c1 1+ P k i=2 iri (1) g r2 (2) g r k P k i=2 isi (1) g s2 (2) g s k (k) ; where a 2 = g P k i=2 ivi (1) g v2 (2) g v k (k) ; for random v 2 ; : : : ; v k in Z q . To demonstrate formula (4), we have P choose one of the two challenges, c 1 or c 2 , at random by itself, so that it can anticipate that challenge by calculating a suitable a i from the self-chosen challenge and a set of randomly self-chosen \responses." To ensure that P cannot choose the other challenge by itself as well, P must use challenges c 1 and c 2 such that, say, the bitwise exclusive-or of c 1 and c 2 is equal to the supplied challenge, c. (Of course, \simulation" is needed only for those sub-formulae that do not hold; if both sub-formulae would be true, P can do without a self-chosen challenge.)
This technique can straightforwardly be generalized to a formula with more than one \OR" connective, and as before an e cient implementation can be obtained by using the proof of knowledge of Section 2. A description based on the RSA/factoring problem is straightforward, and hence omitted.
Putting it all together
We now show how to combine the basic demonstration techniques, in order to demonstrate arbitrary satis able formulae from propositional logic, where the atomic propositions are linear relations over Z q . We hereto rst show how to combine the techniques of Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 in order to demonstrate any satis able formula from propositional logic that has zero or more \AND" connectives and at most one \NOT" connective; these formulae play a central role in combining the basic techniques.
A consistent system consisting of linear relations and one linear inequality can be written as a system of linear relations by introducing a di erence term, denoted by . By appropriate substitution, the system can then be represented by the matrix equation x (1) x (2) . . .
. . .
where f 1 ; : : : ; f l are numbers in Z q . (Clearly, one of the f i 's can always be 1.)
Our technique for demonstrating the boolean formula that corresponds to the system (5) is based on the following result. if and only if it knows a set of secrets that satis es the system (5). As in Proposition 7, is information-theoretically hidden if the proof is witnessindistinguishable, provided that l < k. If k = l, then V can check the validity of the system (5) directly from P's public key, without interacting with P; computing then is as hard as breaking the Discrete Logarithm problem, and has at least O(log jqj) bits that are simultaneously hard-core.
We are now prepared to describe our general technique. Any boolean formula, F, can be expressed in the form F = Q 1 AND AND Q m ; (6) where each sub-formula, Q i , has the format R i1 OR OR R i;mi , and each subsub-formulae, R ij , is a formula from propositional logic that connects linear relations over Z q by zero or more \AND" connectives, at most one \NOT" connective and no other logical connectives. We have just seen how to demonstrate R ij , and by using the technique of Subsection 4.3 we can have P demonstrate a single sub-formula, Q i . To prove the formula F, P needs to demonstrate the validity of all m sub-formulae, Q 1 ; : : : ; Q m . Hereto the corresponding m proofs can all be performed in parallel, responsive to the same challenge.
An optimization is sometimes possible, depending on the complexity of F. Namely, a system of the form (5) can be interpreted as corresponding to an atomic proposition. To demonstrate knowledge for this atomic proposition, our techniques have P demonstrate knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a \distorted" public key, with respect to a \distorted" generator tuple. We can now apply the monotone formula technique of De Santis et al. and Cramer et al. to prove monotone boolean formulae over these atomic propositions. In particular, the restrictions according to which P generates its self-chosen challenges from the supplied challenge can be dictated in accordance with the secret-sharing construction of Benaloh and Leichter 4] for the access structure de ned by the dual of the formula F (see Cramer et al. 15] for details). In other words, expressing F in a more compact form than (6) may lead to a more e cient protocol.
A further optimization is for V to batch-process veri cation relations that correspond to atomic formulae that are connected by \AND" operators; this can be done similarly to the technique of Naccache, M'Ra hi, Raphaeli and Vaudenay 24] for batch veri cation of DSA signatures.
A description of the above techniques based on the di culty of factoring or computing RSA-roots poses no particular di culties, and is hence omitted.
Conclusion
An interesting problem is to extend the set of atomic propositions beyond linear relations. True practicality requires constant-round proofs of knowledge for which the computation and communication complexity are linearly dependent on the number of secrets of P and the size of its public key, but independent of the parameters specifying the atomic proposition or anything else. Our techniques have many practical applications. For example, they can be used to implement the con rmation and the disavowal protocols of Chaum et al. 14] more e ciently (the speed-up is polynomial). The main motivation, however, for devising the techniques in this paper has been to construct all manner of practical privacy-protecting credential mechanisms; this is the subject of a forthcoming paper.
A Proof Modes
If c is chosen at random by V, and 2 t is small, then the protocol must be repeated polynomially many times in order for P's proof to be convincing with overwhelming probability. Sequential repetitions result in a zero-knowledge proof, while parallel repetitions are not zero-knowledge unless preceded by an initial step in which V commits to its challenges (the commit must be unconditionally secure for P in case V is unbounded); alternatively, the challenges are determined in a mutually random fashion by P and V. If 2 t is large then P is convincing with overwhelming probability, without repetitions. The case m = 1 is the Schnorr proof of knowledge 31]; this is widely believed to be witness hiding, although no proof of this is known. In case m 2 the protocol is non-trivially witness indistinguishable and provably witness hiding, and the case m = 2 is Okamoto's proof of knowledge 26, page 36]. The protocol can be made zero-knowledge in the manner described above. The protocol can be performed as a signed proof, meaning that the transcript of the protocol execution is convincing evidence that P has performed a protocol execution. Following Fiat and Shamir 19] , the challenge c is hereto computed as a one-way hash (implying that 2 t is large) of at least a. The hash-function must be such that it is infeasible to obtain more signed proofs than the number of protocol executions that P has engaged in (\unforgeability"). In addition, h and a message may be hashed along; in the latter case the signed proof serves as a digital signature of P on the message. The signed proof consist of (r 1 ; : : : ; r m ), one of a and c, and any (other) information hashed in order to compute c; moreover, h must be included in case it is not associated with P. The Schnorr is hashed along by P.
In signed proof mode, it may be desirable to let V instead of P determine c, for example to enable V to obtain a blinded signed proof (it is straightforward to apply the blinding technique of Okamoto and Ohta 27] ). In the random oracle model, the unforgeability of signed proofs for which c determines the challenge is guaranteed for all m 2, assuming the Discrete Logarithm assumption and provided that P engages in no more than logarithmically many protocol executions; see Pointcheval and Stern 29] .
Other proof modes are available as well. For example, one can perform the protocol as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (see Blum, De Santis, Micali and Persiano 5]), a limited-show proof, a designated veri er proof (see Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo 22]), or a multi-prover proof. As an example of the latter proof mode, consider i parties that have each committed to their own secret, x i , by publishing h i = g xi 1 g yi 2 , for randomly chosen y i ; by taking h to be the product of appropriate powers of the h i 's, they can jointly demonstrate formulae pertaining to their secrets (without revealing them to any other party), by combining their responses in accordance with the formula that is demonstrated.
Finally, we note that the protocol can be modi ed in order to issue a signed proof that can be blinded only restrictively, by using the techniques of 10].
Hereto P and V perform the blinded signed proof with respect to a combination of P's public key and V's public key. In addition to the properties of unforgeability and independence of the signed proof and P's view, it can be proved under the Discrete Logarithm assumption that part of the representation of V remains invariant under V's blinding operations. In the random oracle model, this holds even if polynomially many veri ers, each with a di erent public key, conspire, provided that protocol executions are performed sequentially; for parallel executions, slight modi cations are required, and the security can only be argued heuristically (see 9, 8] ).
